WASHINGTON'S olive branch to the Taliban - no matter the excuses or justifications - amounts to the management of failure, not the mark of victory. Negotiating with the Taliban after more than 10 years of fighting means giving legitimacy and space to militant extremism.
The objective of NATO's post-9/11 intervention in Afghanistan was to starve militant extremism by defeating the nexus of al-Qa'ida and the Pakistan-backed Taliban. That now seems like a dream. With support from Pakistan, the Taliban has m
anaged to prolong the fighting and create a strategic deadlock. The US military surge in 2010 weakened the Taliban but it hardly pressured their strategic support across the Durand line in Pakistan. So the deadlock remains - chiefly because of Pakistan's unwillingness to co-operate fully with NATO.
Pakistan and the Taliban have no interest in producing quick, positive results from talks. The Taliban has already gained certain advantages, including the possible transfer or release of its commanders from US custody, the opening of an office in Qatar, and the legitimacy to enter into mainstream politics at the time of its choosing. It will definitely use these preliminary gains to further its psychological influence over the Afghan populace. And it won't likely bargain away the gains earned by suicide bombings, ambushes and the marginalisation of civil society. Now that the Taliban has guaranteed its basic survival, it will fight for domination.
Washington's talks with the Taliban come at a time when most anti-Taliban leaders in Afghan civil society have deserted President Hamid Karzai. He is head of a heavily subsidised state whose paymaster (Washington) is largely bypassing his government to negotiate with the enemy.
Successful counterinsurgency work requires international troops and the host nation to be seen as unified; that is simply not the case here. Pakistan and the Taliban are more co-ordinated in their approaches than are NATO and Afghanistan, and this is one of the key reasons why concerned anti-Taliban Afghans are creating a third force to ensure their rights and interests are represented and protected. They no longer see Karzai or NATO committed to those interests.
Though fragmented in their approach these forces share a common goal: to counterbalance the growing influence of the Taliban and fill the vacuum created by the declining relevance of Afghanistan's democratic institutions. Certainly no Afghan political coalition can stop Washington from talking to the Taliban - but those talks won't bring stability.
Talks and a ceasefire may provide the US and its NATO allies with a justification for a speedy withdrawal, but it won't change the fundamentals of the problem in Afghanistan. Striking a deal with the Taliban without disarming them will shatter the hope of a strong, viable, pluralistic Afghan state. The Afghan people are against the Taliban and the domination of our country by militant extremism. They have supported and participated in the democratic process, but are now marginalised both by Karzai, who controls massive resources with no accountability, and the international community, which is focused disproportionately on transition, withdrawal and the Taliban.
Afghanistan's neglected majority can provide a political alternative for the military mission in Afghanistan. Its inclusion, which the US could secure by pursuing reconciliation in a way that pressures Karzai to respect the role of parliament and independent judges, would contain or push back the Taliban, increase the cost of war for Pakistan, and provide hope for post-transition Afghanistan. By contrast, should that majority remain outside the strategic calculus, we'll see further fragmentation of political power and legitimacy in Afghanistan. That will weaken Washington's position and endanger the entire mission.
Amrullah Saleh, who directed Afghanistan's national security directorate from 2004 to 2010, is now an opposition political activist
The objective of NATO's post-9/11 intervention in Afghanistan was to starve militant extremism by defeating the nexus of al-Qa'ida and the Pakistan-backed Taliban. That now seems like a dream. With support from Pakistan, the Taliban has mPakistan and the Taliban have no interest in producing quick, positive results from talks. The Taliban has already gained certain advantages, including the possible transfer or release of its commanders from US custody, the opening of an office in Qatar, and the legitimacy to enter into mainstream politics at the time of its choosing. It will definitely use these preliminary gains to further its psychological influence over the Afghan populace. And it won't likely bargain away the gains earned by suicide bombings, ambushes and the marginalisation of civil society. Now that the Taliban has guaranteed its basic survival, it will fight for domination.
Washington's talks with the Taliban come at a time when most anti-Taliban leaders in Afghan civil society have deserted President Hamid Karzai. He is head of a heavily subsidised state whose paymaster (Washington) is largely bypassing his government to negotiate with the enemy.
Successful counterinsurgency work requires international troops and the host nation to be seen as unified; that is simply not the case here. Pakistan and the Taliban are more co-ordinated in their approaches than are NATO and Afghanistan, and this is one of the key reasons why concerned anti-Taliban Afghans are creating a third force to ensure their rights and interests are represented and protected. They no longer see Karzai or NATO committed to those interests.
Though fragmented in their approach these forces share a common goal: to counterbalance the growing influence of the Taliban and fill the vacuum created by the declining relevance of Afghanistan's democratic institutions. Certainly no Afghan political coalition can stop Washington from talking to the Taliban - but those talks won't bring stability.
Talks and a ceasefire may provide the US and its NATO allies with a justification for a speedy withdrawal, but it won't change the fundamentals of the problem in Afghanistan. Striking a deal with the Taliban without disarming them will shatter the hope of a strong, viable, pluralistic Afghan state. The Afghan people are against the Taliban and the domination of our country by militant extremism. They have supported and participated in the democratic process, but are now marginalised both by Karzai, who controls massive resources with no accountability, and the international community, which is focused disproportionately on transition, withdrawal and the Taliban.
Afghanistan's neglected majority can provide a political alternative for the military mission in Afghanistan. Its inclusion, which the US could secure by pursuing reconciliation in a way that pressures Karzai to respect the role of parliament and independent judges, would contain or push back the Taliban, increase the cost of war for Pakistan, and provide hope for post-transition Afghanistan. By contrast, should that majority remain outside the strategic calculus, we'll see further fragmentation of political power and legitimacy in Afghanistan. That will weaken Washington's position and endanger the entire mission.
Amrullah Saleh, who directed Afghanistan's national security directorate from 2004 to 2010, is now an opposition political activist
